Return to Coronet Books main pageMeaning & Argument
A Theory of Meaning Centered on Immediate Argumental Role
By Cesare Cozzo
Mar. 1994
Almqvist & Wiksell
ISBN: 91-22-01648-1
208 p.
$56.50 Paper Original
This study presents and develops the argumental conception of meaning. The two basic principles of the argumental conception of meaning are: i) To know (implicitly) all the argumentation rules concerning that word; ii) To know thes sence of a sentence is to know the syntactic structure of that sentence and to know the senses of the words occuring in it. The sense of a sentence and to know the senses of the words occuring in it. The sense of a sentence is called immediate argumental role of that sentence. According to the argumental conception of meaning a theory of meaning for a particular language yields a systematic specification of the understanding of each sentence of the language which is a specification of the immediate argumental role of that sentence.
The immediate argumental role is a particular aspect of the use of a sentence in arguments. But it is not the whole use in arguments, nor is the whole use of a sentence in arguments reducible to its immediate argumental role. That is why, by accepting the argumental conception of meaning, we can have epistemological holism without linguitic holism.
The argumental conception distinguishes between the understanding between the understanding and the correctness of a language. On the basis of such a distinction we can admit that paradoxical languages are understandable.
The redundancy theory of truth or a realistic conception of truth are compatible with an argumental conception of sense. But here it is argued that, in order to explain assertoric force, an epistemic conception of truth is preferable.
Acceptance of the argumental conception of meaning and of an epistemic conception of truth leads to a rejection of the idea of analytic truth. The argumental conception is pluralistic with respect to the understandability of different logics, and neutral with respect to their correctness.
Philosophy
Series: Stockholm Series in Philosophy